AIRPROX REPORT No 2011147

Date/Time:	21 Oct 2011 1525Z	
Position:	4910N 00216W (APR RW09 Jersey - elev 277ft)	
Airspace:	Jersey ATZ	(*Class: D*)
	Reporting Ac	*Reported Ac*
Type:	JS32	C172
Operator:	CAT	Civ Pte
Alt/FL:	750ft QNH (1023mb)	NR QNH
Weather:	VMC CAVOK	VMC CAVOK
Visibility:	>10km	>10km
Reported Separation:	300ft V/0m H	NK V/NK H
Recorded Separation:	700V / 1.6nm H	



PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

THE JS32 PILOT reports flying a passenger flight under IFR, inbound to Jersey squawking as directed with Modes C and S under the Control of Jersey APR then TWR; TCAS was fitted. While on L base for RW09 at 210kts and 2000ft they were informed that they were number 2 to a light ac; they were passed TI on the ac but nothing was seen. The crew were then instructed to take up a heading of 180° and maintain 2000ft and APR continued to pass TI. The pilot assumed that this was so he could transfer them to TWR and separation from the light ac would then be his responsibility. They were then requested to reduce speed so they reduced to 150kt. They continued on the heading of 180° until they had flown through the LOC and they were then cleared to descend at their discretion so they descended to 1000ft. When they were 1.5 miles through the C/L they were instructed to turn back onto finals and contact TWR. As they turned back (the short way round) they configured the ac and reduced the speed to 130kt. As they came onto final at 750ft, 3-4nm out they called TWR and saw the light ac that was still on L base and at 250ft above the RW. At that point TCAS triggered a "traffic traffic" (it would have been an RA in his view if it was not for the fact they were below 1100ft Rad Alt). At that point he decided that there was risk of a collision if things progressed any further so initiated a go-around and informed TWR. He tried to manoeuvre so that he did not fly directly above the ac but due to the RT loading from TWR he did not think he was very successful and he thought that they overflew other ac with less than 500ft separation. A MOR was raised about other [ATC] aspects of this event.

He assessed the risk as being Medium.

UKAB Note (1): The UK CAA MOR database shows that the other aspects of the incident referred to above are not recorded but there is a comment that they would be investigated locally.

THE C172 PILOT reports flying a blue and white ac on a private local VFR flight from Jersey. He was squawking with Mode C and was in receipt of an 'information service' [assumed to be BS] from Jersey TWR. He was on a visual recovery from the NW corner of the island and he had been cleared to land when an ac behind them [the JS32] contacted Jersey TWR and he believes the pilot called visual with number 1 in sight; ATC replied, "continue" and a female voice then replied, "cleared land" [presumed to be the JS32 first officer]. The response from ATC was, "negative, continue". Subsequently a male voice [presumed to be the JS32 captain] advised ATC, "this isn't going to

work". He believes that the other ac was then offered an orbit by ATC but it was declined and it conducted a missed approach. The [C172] pilot saw the other ac well above and climbing on its missed approach and he does not believe there was ever any risk of collision.

The other ac was then cleared LH downwind to land and as far as the C172 pilot was concerned there was no incident.

THE JERSEY ATC UNIT report (slightly abbreviated below for brevity) stated a C172 was on left base VFR for RW09 working Jersey TWR and a JS32 was made number two behind it. The JS32 was routed on a southerly heading maintaining 2000ft and was given TI on C172. The JS32 did not report gaining visual contact with C172 and as such was routed through the centreline and eventually turned towards the field (the JS32 was approximately 0.5nm S of a 4nm final and the C172 was about 1.5nm final).

The JS32 was advised that he would shortly be number one and instructed to change to Jersey TWR. At no point did the JS32 pilot report visual with C172. Jersey TWR instructed the JS32 to continue approach, number two to the C172 on short final. At about 2.2nm final while indicating 1100ft the JS32 pilot informed TWR that they were too tight behind the C172 and TWR instructed the JS32 to go around. At the pilot's request the ac eventually went into a left hand circuit.

METARs:

EGJJ METAR 1450 METAR EGJJ 211450Z 16011KT 9999 FEW025 13/04 Q1023 NOSIG
EGJJ METAR 1520 METAR EGJJ 211520Z 15009KT 9999 FEW025 12/04 Q1023 NOSIG

RW 09 was in use.

Sequence of events.

1516:20 The JS32 checked in with Jersey APR and after reporting visual with the field, was instructed to route direct to final for RW 09 maintaining altitude 2000 feet.

1518:54 The C172 commenced a turn at the North West corner of Jersey for left base. The JS32 (speed approximately 200kt) was approximately 4nm North West of C172 (speed approximately 90kt).

1519:10 APR instructed the JS32 to turn right heading 180 degrees and to come back on the speed. The position of C172 was also passed and acknowledged.

1520:05 Traffic information was passed to the JS32 on the position of C172: no response.

1520:30 Traffic information passed and JS32 crew questioned if they had the ac in sight: the JS32 crew responded, "we're still looking". An instruction to reduce to minimum approach speed was not read back. The JS32 was cleared to descend below 2000 feet.

1521:10 The JS32, heading 180 degrees, was instructed to turn in towards the field, position approximately 0.5nm south of a 4nm final: C172 on an approximate 1.5nm final.



1521:30 The JS32 was advised shortly number one and instructed to call the TWR. At no point did the JS32 report visual contact with C172.

1521:43 The JS32 contacted TWR and was instructed to continue approach, number two to a C172 on short final.

1522:02 The JS32 (approximate 2.2nm final indicating altitude 1100 feet) advised TWR they were too tight behind C172 (approximate 0.5nm final indicating altitude 600 feet) and at this point were instructed by the TWR controller to carry out a go around, at the pilot's request, into the left hand VFR circuit.

[UKAB Note (2): The RT transcript shows that the TWR controller transmitted at 1522:06:

"JS C/S roger make a left hand orbit or do you want to make a missed approach" and following a conversation with APR:

"JS C/S do you want to make a Left hand orbit or carry out a missed approach" and the pilot replied at 1522:30:

"Missed approach please JS C/S going in dropping into the downwind left hand circuit"]

During R/T and system playback the following was noted:

1515:20 During a controller handover the incoming APR controller was informed:

*"RW 09, 09, 26. With the TWR routing NorthWest corner for left base VFR (C172). Just got airborne not talking to us (*the JS32 JB-JJ*). Cleared in not above altitude 2000 feet towards Corbiere for a right base (*JS32 49N-JJ*). Not released (Trislander 1A- to JB), that's all you have".*

It should be noted that the outgoing APR controller issued C172 with a clearance of not above altitude 1000ft VFR, which was not altered before the ac was transferred to the TWR frequency. This clearance was also visible to the APR controller on the electronic strip situated in the 'With TWR' bay.

1516:45 The EFS strip for C172 was 'binned' by the APR controller from the 'With TWR' bay. At that time the C172 was left hand downwind approaching the North West corner of Jersey and the JS32 was approximately 10 miles North West of the airfield.

15:18:54 At this point the TWR controller rang the APR controller to ask if the JS32 was number one or if C172 could continue to final ahead. The APR controller believed the JS32 was number one but agreed to position the JS32 behind the C172

It is concluded from the investigation that this incident is attributed to the fact that the JS32 was positioned too close behind the C172 which ultimately led to the JS32 performing a go-around. The controller admitted that his perception was that C172 would hold at the North West corner of Jersey and this was exacerbated by the electronic flight strip not being present on the approach controller data display.

When it became apparent that C172 was making an approach the subsequent instructions from the approach controller were predicated on the JS32 gaining visual contact with C172 and ultimately allowing the pilot to self-position. This is common practice with inter island flights.

The controller made a judgement that when the JS32 was instructed to continue approach number two there would be enough distance to stabilise the ac and make a visual approach but the crew of the JS32 elected to discontinue the approach and go around.

There appears to be disparity between the approach controller and the crew of the JS32 in what would constitute a stable and safe approach. Communications between controller and pilot could have been better yet there is no evidence from the investigation to support that this contributed significantly to the event.

The JS32 was on an IFR flight plan operating IFR; the C172 was on a VFR flight plan operating VFR. Traffic information was passed to the JS32, even though it was not read back. The vertical or horizontal separation criteria under UKAIP ENR 1-4-5 do not require IFR flights to be separated from VFR flights. Should the C172 have been operating on Special VFR rules then separation would have been required. No separation was lost during this incident and traffic information had been passed to the JS32 on the VFR flight – C172.

Following the process of handing over the position to the oncoming approach controller, the Electronic Flight Strip showing C172 was 'Binned' from the data display. The only remaining reference to C172 being the Radar Display. It is possible that this strip had been removed from the data display too soon. The C172 was mentioned during the approach position handover, although the ac had already been transferred to the TWR frequency.

Importantly the strip does signify the type of approach and the flight rules; without this strip being displayed it is not easy to ascertain the information.

> Note: Binned is an Electronic Strip Function of removing the strip from the data display. It can be retrieved if required.

Had the approach controller intervened at an earlier point and taken positive control of the situation the JS32 would have been positioned correctly behind C172 and the eventual go-around could have been avoided.

Further training was conducted by UCEs on the process/procedure of 'binning' strips.

UKAB Note (3): Following a request from the UKAB a full transcript was provided. This confirmed the details and UKAB Note (2) above.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available included reports from the pilots of both ac, transcripts of the relevant RT frequencies, radar recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and an investigation report by Jersey ATC.

The Board noted the comprehensive investigation by Jersey ATC, summarised above, and agreed its findings with the following additional comment.

Several Members considered that this was a straightforward go-around occurrence following a reduction of separation rather than an Airprox as, in their view, there was never any risk to either ac and a go-around should be regarded as a normal operating procedure. The Director of the UKAB, however, agreed to investigate the incident as an Airprox since the JS32 pilot, having received a TCAS TA on final and presumably lost sight of the C172 as he carried out his missed approach procedure, wished it to be treated as such.

Although the requirement and procedures for controllers to sequence VFR and IFR traffic inbound in Class D airspace is open to interpretation where the VFR ac is apparently ahead of the IFR one, controller Members agreed that good 'controllership' is to sequence the ac allowing sufficient time for the following (IFR) ac to achieve a stabilised approach. Airline pilot Members agreed, but pointed out that the pilot also has a responsibility to assist this process by applying speed control, to achieve suitable separation. Some Members thought that a RH turn on to final, the long way round, or the orbit offered by the TWR controller, would have resolved the separation problem, but others thought that this would have come too late for the crew to establish a stabilised approach. One pilot Member counselled that achieving a stabilised visual approach over the water to an elevated RW just inland can be very demanding due to the lack of visual clues, so much so that his company prohibit them. Pilot Members agreed unanimously that crews should initiate a go-around in cases where a stabilised approach cannot be achieved, for whatever reason, and this action should not be seen as any criticism of the crew.

APR initially instructed the JS32 crew to route direct to "final for RW09", an imprecise point. The Board noted that the crew was not cleared for a visual approach. Shortly afterwards the APR controller, who had intended the JS32 to be No1 to land, agreed with TWR that the JS32 would be No2 to the C172. To achieve separation between the ac, APR instructed the JS32 crew to head 180° and reduce speed, but he did not inform the crew that they were No2. For their part, the crew acknowledged the heading instruction but not the speed reduction. APR then passed accurate TI on the C172 on their LH side before a second instruction to reduce speed, which was also not acknowledged by the JS32 crew. Members agreed that the controller should have advised the crew that they were No2, but considered that the crew should have realised from the heading instruction that they were being sequenced with other traffic. In the event, it was only after they had been instructed to turn in towards the airfield and were being instructed to contact TWR at 15:21:33 that APR advised them that they would shortly be No1. Members agreed that at that stage there was little that the JS32 crew could do to increase separation, which was too tight. The JS32 crew called on the TWR frequency at 1521:42 and were cleared to continue at 1521:54 as the C172 was still on short final and the JS32 was about 2nm out. Although several other signals were available, this was the first occasion that the JS32 crew were formally told by ATC that they were No2 to the C172 and it came too late for them to implement any meaningful speed control measures (a pilot Member stated

that the last point for speed control is deemed to be 4nm). Another pilot Member opined however, that as a general rule good airmanship would have been not to 'turn in' before being visual with the ac ahead or being informed that it had landed.

Both pilot and controller Members agreed that the JS32 crew had not been given enough information to assist the controller in achieving satisfactory separation on finals and that the APR controller, having accepted the responsibility, had turned the JS32 back towards the field too early.

Members agreed unanimously that there had been no risk of collision; a majority, however, considered there had been enough deviations from normally accepted ATC and operating procedures for the incident to warrant a rating of C (an Airprox in which there was no risk of collision) rather than an E (a non-event).

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK

Cause: A large disparity in groundspeeds caused the JS32 crew to fly a go-around.

Degree of Risk: C.